This case concerned tax-exemption for churches, and as is
often the case, even when the Supreme Court seems to rule in
favor of religion, they have succeeded in digging its grave
a little deeper. Justice Brennan, concurring, declared:
Their principal effect is to carry out secular
purposes—the encouragement of public service activities
and of a pluralistic society.
During their ordinary operations, most churches engage in
activities of a secular
nature that benefit the community; and all churches
by their existence contribute to the diversity
of association, viewpoint, and enterprise so highly valued
by all of us. The means churches use to carry on their
public service activities are not
'essentially religious' in nature. They are the
same means used by any purely
secular organization—money, human time and
skills, physical facilities. It is true that each church
contributes to the pluralism
of our society through its purely religious activities,
but that state encourages these activities not because it
champions religion per se but because it values religion
among a variety of private,
nonprofit enterprises that contribute to the diversity
of the Nation. [397
U.S. 664 , 692-93]
Second, government grants exemptions to religious
organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism
of American society by their religious activities.
Government may properly include religious institutions
among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that
receive tax exemptions, for each group contributes to the diversity
of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a
vigorous, pluralistic
society. See Washington Ethical Society v. District of
Columbia, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 373, 249 F.2d 127,
129 (1957) [397
U.S. 664 , 689]
("Ethical Society" is a branch of the
religion of Secular Humanism. That case gave them tax
exemption, and was cited in Torcaso's
infamous "Footnote
11.")
In other words, the State no longer grants tax-free
status to churches because we render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's and the things that are God's to God, nor
because the State is "under God"
and churches are a holy sanctuary which even the greatest
emperors would not breach, but because the Humanistic
Supreme Court magnanimously views churches as having a
tolerable role to play in the creation of their new
"pluralistic" secular society.
Justice Douglas would throw out the exemptions entirely,
but would agree with Justice Brennan on the mandate for
"pluralism":
[O]ne of the mandates of the First Amendment is to
promote a viable, pluralistic
society and to keep government neutral,
not only between sects, but also between believers and
nonbelievers. [397
U.S. 664 , 716]
It is true that the Founding Fathers were not hostile
toward non-Christian religions. See
their comments here. And of course, the Founders
believed in denominational pluralism, in which each
Christian denomination is on an equal legal footing. But the
Framers did not espouse pure pluralism. Non-Christian
religions could exist only insofar as they stayed within
Christian boundaries — no sacrificing virgins, no
polygamy, no pagan perversions. See
the evidence here. We were one nation "under
God" — a particular God, with particular moral
standards. Pluralism is a myth. It
is political polytheism. America was a distinctly Christian
nation. Read the Founders' views here.
Walz held that tax exemptions had a long history
and were therefore constitutional. Justice Douglas
challenged the Court by noting that school prayer had an
equally long history, but that did not stop the Court from
throwing prayer out of schools. Despite its apparently
favorable ruling, Walz is a dangerous case. And Lemon
v. Kurtzman proves it.
Taking its cue from the Walz
case, this case may be more frequently cited than Everson.
The so-called "Lemon Test" dominated church-state
cases for more than 20 years, and is still pulled out in
emergencies, despite its criticisms.
Every analysis in this area must begin with
consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the
Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned
from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must
not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion." Walz,
supra, at 674. [403
U.S. 602, 612-13]
This is certainly convenient for Secular Humanists. Every
legislation must have for its purpose a
goal which is acceptable to Humanists, its primary
effect must not be to advance the interests of those
who oppose Humanism, and it must not bring the government
"under God" in an
"excessive" way. Is there any wonder that
Secularism has advanced so?
How does this "secular purpose/secular effect"
test conform to the principles and practice of the Founding
Fathers? Here is how
James Madison argued against a very important piece of
legislation. He opposed it
12. Because, the policy of the
bill is adverse to the diffusion of the light of
Christianity. The first wish of those who enjoy this
precious gift, ought
to be that it may be imparted to the whole race of mankind.
Compare the number of those who have as yet received it
with the number still remaining under the dominion of false
Religions; and how small is the former!
Does the policy of the Bill tend to lessen the
disproportion? No; it at once discourages those who are
strangers to the light of (revelation) from coming into
the Region of it; and countenances, by example the nations
who continue in darkness, in shutting out those who
might convey it to them. Instead of levelling as far as
possible, every obstacle to the victorious progress of
truth, the Bill with an ignoble and unchristian timidity
would circumscribe it, with a wall of defence, against the
encroachments of error.
Madison felt no compulsion to muster up a "secular
purpose." He said the bill should be defeated
precisely because it did not advance "the
light of Christianity." Today, however,
legislation will be struck down by the Court if one of those
who sponsored the bill hoped it might benefit Christianity
in some in indirect way. (Wallace v.
Jaffree, 1985; Edwards v.
Aguillard, 1987)
The "secular purpose" and "secular
effect" prongs of the "Lemon test" are
corollaries of the view that society should be secular and
religion kept out of the public square. As Justice Brennan
would write in Marsh v. Chambers
(1983), the "Lemon test"
embodies a judgment, born of a long and turbulent
history, that, in our society, religion "must be
a private matter for the individual, the family,
and the institutions of private choice . . . ." Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S., at 625.
It is true that the Framers gave no power to the new
government to tell churches which scent of incense they must
use. Many other questions of "worship" or belief
are rightly considered "private" questions. But
the Founders also agreed with Ben Franklin, who knew quite
well the value of Christianity to society, and who, in the
context of teaching history to the youth of Philadelphia,
said:
History will also afford the frequent opportunities of
showing the necessity of a public religion,
from its usefulness to the public; the advantage of a
religious character among private persons; the mischiefs
of superstition, &c. and the excellency of the
Christian religion above all others, ancient or modern.
(Benjamin Franklin, Proposals Relating to the
Education of Youth in Pennsylvania (Philadelphia,
1749), p. 22.)
The Founders believed in
public religion. Official proclamations of national days
of prayer and public appeals to the God of the Bible in the
Addresses and Orders of every single Congress and President
this nation has had since its inception in 1776 (and before)
show that no one intended the Constitution to exile
Christianity to the world of the "noumenal" and
require every law to pass in review before the
religion of Secular Humanism.
Observing the evolution of the Court's many
"tests" and the increasing hostility toward
Christianity, one is reminded of Thomas Jefferson's warning:
The Constitution . . . is a mere thing of wax in the
hands of the judiciary which they may twist and shape into
any form they please.
(to Judge Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819.)
The "separation of church and state" as
promulgated by the Supreme Court, is a myth.